Email security for solicitors: stopping Friday afternoon fraud
Law firms hold client money and move large sums on deadlines, which makes them an obvious target. The most common attack is simple. A criminal sends an email that looks like it comes from the firm or the client, and asks for money to go to a new bank account. The Law Society calls the conveyancing version "Friday-afternoon fraud": targeted attacks timed for when a property sale completes [3].
This guide sets out what the regulator and the Law Society say about it, and the technical settings that make it harder to impersonate your firm.
How big the problem is
Email modification fraud is the most common type of cyber attack reported to the SRA. It made up 68% of reports in 2020 [3]. The SRA says most of those cases involved clients sending money to fraudsters [1]. In its 2022 Risk Outlook, the SRA said more than 80% of the cybercrime reports it received in 2021 involved email [2]. Conveyancing is still a frequent target, but the SRA has seen these attacks spread to probate, litigation and negligence settlements [1][2].
The methods vary. Some attacks use a look-alike address, such as one where an "O" has been swapped for a zero. Others come from a real mailbox that criminals have taken over, often with a hidden forwarding rule that copies them into every message [1].
What the SRA expects
The SRA's guidance is practical rather than technical, and its main points are clear [1]:
- Tell clients, early and in writing, that you will never change your bank details by email.
- Check bank-detail changes through a channel other than email, such as a phone call to a number you already hold.
- Train every member of staff, including receptionists and senior partners, to slow down when a payment request feels rushed.
- Look for forwarding rules on mailboxes, which are a common sign of compromise.
- Report incidents to the SRA, even when the money has been replaced.
The guidance also names a technical control. It notes that the NCSC recommends DMARC as a way to configure email that helps stop phishing and email modification, and its checklist asks firms whether they are aware of DMARC [1].
The money at stake is real. Under the SRA Accounts Rules, firms must replace client money that has been wrongly paid out straight away. The SRA describes one firm that had to cover a £400,000 shortage from its office account after a fraud [1].
What the Law Society says
A February 2024 feature on the Law Society's website about a disciplinary case shows the stakes. A solicitor received an email from a slightly different address, asked for phone confirmation, accepted a second email instead and paid away more than £290,000. The tribunal fined the solicitor £10,000 and ordered £16,000 in costs. The solicitor also hadn't reported the loss to the SRA for three months, because insurers had replaced the money [3]. The article's advice is to train staff to check the sender's domain name, warn clients, verify bank details by phone or face to face, and know your reporting duties. Those duties include telling your bank, your insurer, the SRA and the national fraud reporting service [3].
Where your domain settings come in
None of that guidance replaces good process. But there is one thing a firm can do that protects its clients as well as itself, and that is to stop criminals sending email that uses its exact domain.
Three DNS records do this job [4]:
- SPF lists the servers that are allowed to send email for your domain.
- DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to the email you send, so receivers can check it really came from you.
- DMARC tells receiving servers what to do with email that claims to be from your domain but fails those checks. It can also send you reports showing who is sending as you.
The DMARC policy is the part that matters most. p=none means "monitor only", so fake mail is still delivered. p=quarantine asks receivers to treat failures as suspicious, for example by sending them to spam. p=reject asks them to refuse the mail outright [5]. A firm with p=reject and its own mail properly authenticated has closed the easiest route for a fraudster pretending to be the firm.
Be clear about what this doesn't do. DMARC doesn't stop a look-alike domain such as smith-sol1citors.co.uk. It doesn't help if a real mailbox has been taken over, because that mail genuinely comes from you. That is why the SRA's process controls, MFA on every mailbox and checks for forwarding rules still matter [1].
A short checklist for firms
- Check that SPF, DKIM and DMARC are all published for your main domain and for any other domain you send from.
- Move DMARC to
p=quarantineand then top=rejectonce the reports show all your genuine senders pass. Your case management system and marketing tools count as senders too. - Protect domains you own but don't use for email with "no mail" records, so they can't be used to fake messages either.
- Turn on MFA for every mailbox, and review forwarding rules regularly.
- Put your "we never change bank details by email" warning in your client care letter and your email signature.
- Keep a written incident plan that lists who to call: your bank, your insurer, the SRA and Report Fraud. Report Fraud replaced Action Fraud in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in December 2025 [6].
Check your domain free
You can check your firm's domain for free at faultypacket.co.uk. It shows in plain English whether your SPF, DKIM and DMARC are in place and what your DMARC policy would do with a fake email. If something needs fixing, the £24 Fix Pack gives you the exact records to add, in a safe order, and re-checks each one live once you've added it.
DNS on Cloudflare? Fix it for me adds your SPF and DMARC records in one click (£49 plus VAT, Fix Pack included). To hear if anything changes later, monitoring checks your domain every day from £4 a month.
Guides for other sectors: Accountants · Estate agents.
Sources
- SRA, "How to reduce the risk of being affected by cybercrime" (23 Nov 2020): https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/resources/cybercrime/cybersecurity-advice/
- SRA, "Risk Outlook report: information security and cybercrime in a new normal" (1 Jun 2022): https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/research-publications/risk-outlook-report-information-security-cybercrime/
- The Law Society, "Solicitor fined for failing to spot Friday afternoon cyber fraud" (16 Feb 2024): https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/regulation/solicitor-fined-for-failing-to-spot-friday-afternoon-cyber-fraud
- NCSC, "Email security and anti-spoofing": https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/email-security-and-anti-spoofing
- IETF, RFC 9989, DMARC (May 2026), section on the p tag: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9989.txt
- Report Fraud, "Report Fraud service goes live" (4 Dec 2025): https://www.reportfraud.police.uk/news/report-fraud-service-goes-live/