Could someone fake an email from the NHS, a university or a housing association?
On 9 November 2026 we read the public DMARC records of 544 email domains run by UK NHS bodies, universities and English housing associations. 188 of them (34.6%) would have fake email using the organisation’s own domain delivered as normal, because they have no DMARC policy or one set to p=none. We name no organisations. These are observations, not accusations.
Why this matters
Anyone can put an organisation’s address in the “From” line of an email. DMARC tells Gmail, Microsoft and other receivers what to do when a message claims to come from that domain but fails authentication: p=reject refuses it, p=quarantine sends it to junk, and p=none or no record at all lets it through as normal.
Patients get appointment letters and test results by email, students get fee and accommodation emails, and tenants pay rent on the strength of an email from their landlord. That makes these names useful to fraudsters.
What we observed (9 Nov 2026)
| Sector | Email domains | Reject | Quarantine | Monitoring only | No record | Fakes delivered as normal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NHS bodies (UK) | 131 | 67 (51.1%) | 11 (8.4%) | 12 | 41 | 53 (40.5%) |
| Universities and HE providers (UK) | 191 | 53 (27.7%) | 77 (40.3%) | 57 | 4 | 61 (31.9%) |
| Housing associations (England) | 222 | 77 (34.7%) | 71 (32.0%) | 63 | 11 | 74 (33.3%) |
Quarantine includes 10 university and 3 housing domains that apply it to only part of the failing mail (pct below 100).
- NHS: most trusts that do protect their domain use
p=reject. The gap is domains with no DMARC record at all (41). In Northern Ireland all 6 health and social care trust domains we checked would deliver fakes, though that is a very small sample. - Universities: almost every university has a DMARC record, but 57 are still in monitoring mode.
- Housing associations: 63 are in monitoring mode. Tenants pay rent and deposits by email instruction, so a fake “our bank details have changed” message is a known risk.
Still pointing at a closed government service
NCSC’s Mail Check service used to read public bodies’ DMARC and TLS reports for them. It stopped processing DMARC reports on 24 March 2025, along with its TLS reporting, and the whole service closed on 31 March 2026. Yet 134 of these 544 domains still list Mail Check’s reporting addresses in their DNS: 55 NHS, 53 university and 26 housing association domains. For those organisations, no one at Mail Check has read those reports for over 18 months. The government’s guidance Securing government email still recommends signing up to Mail Check. Sources: NCSC, Mail Check update; NCSC, retiring Mail Check and Web Check. See also what to use instead of Mail Check.
Staffordshire
We also checked 62 email domains of public bodies in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent. Every council, NHS, university, police and fire service domain we checked asks receivers to reject or quarantine fakes (one other public office is still in monitoring mode). The gap is at the most local level: 28 of 41 parish council email domains in East Staffordshire (68%) would let fake email in the council’s name be delivered as normal. Small councils often have a part-time clerk and no IT team, and a fake email from “the clerk” asking for an urgent payment is a known scam.
This is not a finding that any organisation has been impersonated, or that any is non-compliant. Moving from p=none to p=reject is normally done in stages while every service that sends email for the organisation is found and authenticated.
Method
- Lists: NHS trusts, foundation trusts, integrated care boards, health boards and HSC trusts from the NHS Organisation Data Service; universities and HE providers from the Office for Students register and the recognised-body lists for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; housing associations and other private registered providers from the Regulator of Social Housing’s 2026 data release; Staffordshire bodies from the GOV.UK local-authority API, NHS ODS, the OfS register and East Staffordshire Borough Council’s parish council list.
- Domains: the organisational domain of each body’s website. Email domains only: we left out domains with no MX record (105 NHS domains, mostly bodies whose staff use NHSmail on nhs.net, plus a few others), and 15 that could not be looked up or no longer exist.
- Query: public DNS only, over DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) and Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8), on 9 Nov 2026 between 20:47 and 21:09 UK time, at a paced rate. We made no connections to the organisations’ own servers. A random sample of 20 domains was re-checked independently the same evening and matched exactly.
- Classification: by the
p=tag of the domain’s DMARC record, with apctbelow 100 counted separately. Mail Check addresses means a DMARCruaatdmarc.service.gov.ukor a TLS-RPTruaatmailcheck.service.ncsc.gov.uk. - Data: aggregate totals only, with no domain names, in this CSV (CC BY 4.0).
Limits
- A snapshot from 9 Nov 2026. DNS changes all the time.
- We treat each body’s website domain as its main email domain. Many NHS staff send from nhs.net, which is protected separately and not counted here.
- DMARC is one layer. Receivers can still block a fake for other reasons, and a domain on
p=rejectcan still be imitated with a look-alike domain. - Parish council websites are sometimes run by volunteers or village groups, so a parish domain may not be the one the clerk sends from.
Related: Could someone fake a UK council’s email? (376 council domains, 8 Nov 2026).
Could someone fake your email?
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Journalists and researchers can ask for the method note or domain-level detail at [email protected]. Requests are reviewed by a person.